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A Monumental Undertaking – Tackling 
Vestiges of the Confederacy in the Florida 
Landscape 
By: Juanita Solis 
“The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”1 
Symbols of the Confederacy have been a volatile topic across the 
country as recent events have spurred new resistance to their 
display. Part I of this note provides a brief introduction into the 
current controversy surrounding Confederate monuments in the 
United States, with a particular emphasis on the erected 
memorials in the Florida landscape. Part II argues that 
Confederate monuments were mainly erected with the intention of 
advancing racial subordination during time periods in American 
history where black Americans resisted white supremacy. As 
shown by the events that followed right–wing violence in both 
South Carolina and Virginia, this note argues that contemporary 
displays of monuments and other Confederate symbols continues 
to serve this purpose. Part III goes on to describe constitutional 
challenges which have proved to be ineffective in addressing the 
display of these monuments, as well as legislative efforts which 
suffer from resistance of interpretation. Finally, through various 
examples, this note concludes that activists in support of the 
removal of Confederate symbols will be better served by 
dedicating their efforts to community remembrance projects and 
dedications. 
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1 William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun 92 (1950). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 17, 2015, Dylann Roof, a 21–year–old white supremacist, 
massacred nine black members of the Mother Emanuel African Methodist 
Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina during a Bible study 
meeting.2 Photos of Roof later surfaced depicting him with the 
Confederate battle flag in one hand, and a gun in the other.3 Roof would 
later admit that he intended to start a race war.4 In response to this horrific 
act of terror, pressure grew to eliminate Confederate iconography from 
other public spaces across the South.5 Although many opposed public 
                                                                                                             
2 See Ralph Ellis, Ed Payne, Evan Perez, & Dana Ford, Shooting suspect in custody 
after Charleston church massacre, CNN (June 18, 2015, 11:50 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/18/us/charleston–south–carolina–shooting/index.html. 
3 Frances Robles, Dylann Roof Photos and a Manifesto are Posted on Website, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/us/dylann–storm–roof–
photos–website–charleston–church–shooting.html. 
4 See Lenny Berstein, Sari Horwitz, & Peter Holley, Dylann Roof’s racist manifesto: ‘I 
have no choice,’ THE WASH. POST. (June 20, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/national/health–science/authorities–investigate–whether–racist–man 
ifesto–was–written–by–sc–gunman/2015/06/20/f0bd3052–1762–11e5–9ddc–e335354210 
0c_story.html?utm_term=.ad5748637396. 
5 Id. 
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displays honoring the Confederacy, their objections were met with little 
success. 
Although public debate surrounding Confederate monuments across 
the states seemed to be dying down, on August 12, 2017, a ”Unite the 
Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia brought national attention to this 
issue once again.6 What began as a protest of the removal of a Confederate 
statue by Neo–Nazis, Klansmen, and White Nationalists, later developed 
into a murderous act of domestic terror.7 While carrying torches and 
waving Confederate flags, protesters chanted phrases like, “You will not 
replace us. Jews will not replace us,” according to the New York Times.8 
In the wake of this event, officials in other Southern states quickly moved 
for the removal of Confederate monuments fearing similar violence and 
unrest.9 Despite numerous high–profile removals,10 a substantial number 
of Confederate Civil War monuments, memorials, and symbols remain in 
public spaces around the country. More than piles of brass and marble, 
Confederate memorials continue to exist as proxies for our country’s racist 
legacy. This note aims to highlight the historical context in which 
Confederate monuments were generally erected to point out that current 
display of Confederate memorials continues to serve an exclusionary 
purpose. In light of the fact that prior constitutional challenges and 
legislative efforts have generally proved to be ineffective in addressing 
contemporary display of Confederate symbols, communities who wish to 
bring about change in the Florida landscape should consider community 
remembrance projects as more effective alternatives. 
II. CONFEDERATE MEMORIALS ACROSS THE COUNTRY – A SPLC 
STUDY 
Following the massacre in Charleston,11 the Southern Poverty Law 
Center (“SPLC”) launched an effort to catalog and map Confederate 
                                                                                                             
6 See Sheryl G. Stolberg & Brian M. Rosenthal, Man Charged After White Nationalist 
Rally in Charlottesville Ends in Deadly Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/us/charlottesville–protest–white–nationalist.html?hp&acti 
on=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story–heading&module=a–lede–package–
region&region=top–news&WT.nav=top–news. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 See Jess Bidgood, Mathew Bloch, Morrigan McCarthy, Liam Stack, & Wilson 
Andrews, Confederate Monuments Are Coming Down Across the United States. Here’s a 
List, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2017/08/16/us/confederate–monuments–removed.html. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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iconography in public spaces around the Country in the last 150 years.12 
The report – Whose Heritage? Public Symbols of the 
Confederacy – identifies 1,503 examples of monuments and statues; flags; 
city, county and school names; lakes, dams and other public works; state 
holidays; and other symbols that honor the Confederacy.13 Relying on 
federal, state, and local databases, the SPLC tallied a wide range of 
Confederate symbols in the public spaces of a total of 31 states around the 
country.14 Many of these memorials were located in states that belonged 
to the Union such as New York and California.15 
In its study, the SPLC takes into account everything from Stone 
Mountain in Georgia, to a workaday obelisk in Anniston, Alabama, which 
commemorates Major John Pelham.16 As part of an extensive list of 
Confederate iconography, the report identifies more than 718 
Confederate monuments and statues on Public property, 551 of which 
were dedicated or built prior to 1950.17 Although a state–by–state list of 
government–sanctioned Confederate symbols is included, the report does 
not mention nearly 2,600 Civil War battlefields, museums, cemeteries and 
other places that are largely historical in nature.18 The SPLC also tallied 
45 Confederate monuments that were dedicated or rededicated during 
the civil rights movement, and 32 since the year 2000.19 While there have 
been at least 100 attempts at the state and local levels to remove or alter 
publicly supported symbols of the Confederacy, the vast majority of these 
memorials remain.20 
III. REMNANTS OF THE CONFEDERACY IN THE FLORIDA LANDSCAPE 
Ranking 10th out of 31 states mentioned in the study, the state of 
Florida has dedicated 61 confederate markers or monuments since 1861.21 
Excluding those on battlefields and cemeteries, there are 25 Confederate 
monuments that are currently displayed on public land in the state of 
Florida.22 Most were commissioned during the Jim Crow era and built by 
                                                                                                             
12 The S. Poverty L. Ctr., Whose Heritage? Public Symbols of the Confederacy (Apr. 
21, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/whoseheritage_splc.pdf 
[hereinafter SPLC Report]. 
13 Id. at 8. 
14 Id. at 16. 
15 Id. at 9. 
16 Id. at 8. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 9. 
22 Id. 
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the United Daughters of the Confederacy.23 Moreover, the report notes 7 
public schools, 6 public parks, and 14 roads, streets, or highways that were 
named after prominent Confederates.24 Like North Carolina, Kentucky, 
and Louisiana, Florida has also Confederate holidays authorized in its state 
code even though it did not officially observe them as a state in 2016.25 
Following the events in Charlottesville, authorities in Florida 
struggled to avoid a repeat of the fatal violence that erupted at the 
University of Virginia: in Gainesville, FL, a statue, nicknamed “Old Joe,” 
which stood in front of the Alachua County Administration Building for 
nearly 113–years. On August 14, 2017, the United Daughters of the 
Confederacy – the same group that erected the statue in 1904 – hired O.T. 
Davis Monument Company to remove it.26 Although the statue’s removal 
had been in the works for months, protests caused several failed attempts 
to relocate it. Since its removal, the statue has been relocated to Oak Ridge 
Cemetery near Rochelle, southeast of Gainesville. 
In another instance, commissioners in Hollywood, Florida, approved 
a plan to rename streets named after Confederate commanders; Robert E. 
Lee, John Bell Hood, and Nathan Bedford Forrest (the first grand wizard 
of the Ku Klux Klan).27 On August 30, 2017, Commissioners spent nearly 
five hours debating the issue as they listened to more than 130 people who 
signed up to speak. Some of the speakers included Congresswoman 
Debbie Wasserman Schultz and State Representative Joe Geller. In 
anticipation of the vote, protesters peacefully gathered outside City Hall 
with signs and posters. Although a call to rename Forrest Street went 
ignored 15 years ago, the controversy around these street names 
resurfaced in 2015 when vandals painted over street signs.28 While all 
three streets extend through the entire city, only two — Forrest and Hood 
                                                                                                             
23 Id., supra note 12; see also Mario Ariza, Florida has More than 30 Confederate 
Monuments, NEW TROPIC (Aug. 13, 2017), https://thenewtropic.com/florida–30–
confederate–monuments–taking–them–down [hereinafter New Tropic Report]. 
24 SPLC Report, supra note 12, at 19–20. 
25 Id. at 10. 
26 Andrew Caplan, Confederate Statue Removed from Downtown Gainesville, THE 
GAINESVILLE SUN (last updated Aug. 14, 2017, 11:32 PM), http://www.gainesville.com/ 
news/20170814/confederate–statue–removed–from–downtown–gainesville. 
27 Susannah Bryan, Under Pressure, Hollywood to Rename Streets Honoring 
Confederate Generals, SUN SENTINEL (July 3, 2017, 8:45 PM), http://www.sun–
sentinel.com/local/broward/hollywood/fl–sb–confederate–streets–hollywood–drama–
20170703–story.html. 
28 Susannah Bryan, Street Fight: When Hollywood Shrugged Over Confederate Street 
Names, One Man Stood Firm, SUN SENTINEL (July 9, 2017, 6:05 PM), http://www.sun–
sentinel.com/local/broward/hollywood/fl–sb–confederate–streets–hollywood–benjamin–
israel–20170705–story.html. 
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— run through the predominantly black Liberia neighborhood.29 
Under current plans, reports note that Forrest Street is expected to become 
Savannah Street, Hood Street will change to Macon, and Lee will become 
Louisville.30 
In spite of these efforts, a great number of monuments still stand. A 
few of these include, a 50–foot pillar topped with a statue of General Lee 
in the center of Pensacola, a well–preserved monument of the Confederate 
soldiers of Jackson County that stands just north of the courthouse in a 
traffic circle, and a Confederate monument in a park in Jacksonville, 
Florida which is itself called “Confederate Park.”31 Consistent with the 
SPLC’s findings, many of the monuments in Florida dedicated to the 
Confederacy were erected in more recent years. In St. Cloud, Florida, a 
Confederate monument commemorating Robert E. Lee Road stands 
despite the fact that the city was founded in large part by thousands of 
Union veterans.32 The monument in St. Cloud along with at least 30 others 
nationwide were unveiled in the 21st century as most were erected during 
the 1950s and ‘60s in the midst of the civil rights movement.33 Moreover, 
plinths, plaques and obelisks found in Old Town, Trenton, and White 
Springs, Perry County, and St. Cloud were all dedicated in the past 15 
years.34 
IV. CONFEDERATE SYMBOLS & THEIR HISTORICAL LINKS 
In addition to compiling a list of Confederate monuments and symbols 
spread over 31 states – plus the District of Columbia – the SPLC outlines 
two major time periods during which the dedication of these monuments 
spiked.35 Both involved times of extreme civil rights tension. A common 
misconception among supporters of these symbols is that Confederate 
                                                                                                             
29 Susannah Bryan, Hollywood Ready for Final Vote on Confederate Streets – and So 
Are Protesters, SUN SENTINEL (Aug. 28, 2017, 6:50 PM), http://www.sun–
sentinel.com/local/broward/hollywood/fl–sb–street–names–hollywood–protest–
20170828–story.html. 
30 Id. 
31 Mario Ariza, Florida has More than 30 Confederate Monuments, NEW TROPIC (Aug. 
13, 2017), https://thenewtropic.com/florida–30–confederate–monuments–taking–them–
down [hereinafter New Tropic Report]. 
32 Id. 
33 Katie Zezima & Aaron Williams, The Battle Over Our Nation’s Confederate 
Remnants, THE WASH. POST. (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
graphics/2017/national/confederate–monuments/?utm_term=.de5f6c1daf24. 
34 Id. 
35 The S. Poverty L. Ctr., Whose Heritage? Public Symbols of the Confederacy 19–20 
(Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/whoseheritage_splc.pdf 
[hereinafter SPLC Report]. 
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monuments were shortly erected after the war’s end in 1865.36 Instead, 
most monuments were built between the 1890s and 1950s.37 Unlike the 
earlier memorials that were built to mourn dead soldiers from the Civil 
War, these monuments tended to glorify leaders of the Confederacy like 
General Robert E. Lee, or General “Stonewall” Jackson.38 Statues were 
placed in front of state buildings, city squares, and courthouses, and not 
in cemeteries, as was common in earlier years. According to the report, 
[t]wo distinct periods saw a significant rise in the 
dedication of monuments and other symbols. The first 
began around 1900, amid the period in which states were 
enacting Jim Crow laws to disenfranchise the newly freed 
African Americans and re–segregate society. This spike 
lasted well into the 1920s, a period that saw a dramatic 
resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan, which had been born in 
the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. 
The second spike began in the early 1950s and lasted 
through the 1960s, as the civil rights movement led to a 
backlash among segregationists. These two periods also 
coincided with the 50th and 100th anniversaries of the 
Civil War.39 
Around the turn of the 20th century, the country saw another spike in 
the emergence of Confederate monuments and symbols.40 Founded in the 
1890s, organizations like the United Daughters of the Confederacy and the 
Sons of Confederate Veterans were instrumental in raising funds to build 
these monuments.41 For many blacks in the South, emancipation had done 
little to change the omnipresent threat of violence in their lives. Through 
the enforcement of Jim Crow laws, and the systematic exclusion of 
African–Americans from participating in Southern governments, whites 
aimed to reassert their control over the South by enforcing and 
systematically disenfranchising and disempowering black individuals.42 In 
1896, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of state laws 
which racially segregated public facilities deemed to be “separate but 
                                                                                                             
36 Id. at 9. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 7. 
39 Id. at 9. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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equal” in Plessy vs. Ferguson.43 Following this landmark case, a spike in 
the dedication of Confederate monuments is recorded.44 Moreover, a final 
spike is reported around 1909 after the creation of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”), which 
steadily continued until the reemergence of the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”). 
Once the construction of Confederate monuments began to taper off, 
a backlash to the Civil Rights Movement spread Confederate symbols in 
other ways. According to the SPLC, the country’s more than 718 
monuments are only a part of a total of 1,503 symbols of the Confederacy 
tallied in public spaces.45 In 1954, Southern states experienced a sudden 
rise in the dedication of schools named in honor of Confederate soldiers 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education.46 In addition, the Confederate battle flag – rather than 
Confederate monuments – became more prevalent in its usage as a symbol 
of resistance to desegregation in the 1950s and 60s. The decision to fly the 
flag over state capitols and city halls across the region came at time when 
states began to push back against the federal government’s growing 
enforcement of civil rights in the South.47 In 1956, Georgia redesigned its 
state flag to include the Confederate battle flag.48 Similarly, in 1962, 
South Carolina placed the flag atop its capitol building.49 Scholars have 
argued that there is no need to inquire into the motives behind this action 
as during a 1960 speech celebrating the secession centennial, Senator John 
D. Long – the Senator that introduced the resolution to raise the flag – 
addressed the South Carolina Senate to praise the Ku Klux Klan stating, 
“[w]e honor them and we are proud of them.” The legislator asked 
members of the senate to “dismiss from your consideration any little–sister 
sob stories about the South’s brutality to the slave and its inhuman 
                                                                                                             
43 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954). 
44 SPLC Report, supra note 12, at 5. 
45 Id. 
46 See Id. at 6 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (“Brown I”; declaring 
racially segregated public schools unconstitutional); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 
299 (1955) (“Brown II”; ordering the desegregation of public schools “with all deliberate 
speed.”)). 
47 Id. 
48 See Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of Georgia, No. 29, 1 General Acts 
and Resolutions 38 (1956) (“Redesigned to look like the Confederate flag after the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, the Georgia state flag is a replica 
of the Confederate flag.”); see also James Forman, Jr., Driving Dixie Down: Removing the 
Confederate Flag from Southern State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505, 505 (1991) (“In 
Alabama, the Confederate flag was raised in 1963 as part of Governor Wallace’s 
“Segregation Forever” campaign.”). 
49 SPLC Report, supra note 35, at 9. 
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treatment of captive and fugitive slaves.”50 Three years later, Alabama 
followed after Governor George Wallace raised the Confederate flag at the 
state capitol as a visual reminder of his “Segregation Forever” campaign.51 
Although the Confederate flag had been used sparingly for decades, it 
“became a mainstay at Ku Klux Klan rallies as the organization launched 
a campaign of bombings, murders, and other violence against African 
Americans and civil rights activists.”52 According to the SPLC, the flag 
was not only extensively used by the KKK as part of a campaign of terror 
against black Americans during the civil rights movement, but it was also 
commonly utilized by segregationists in positions of power in their 
defense of Jim Crow.53 Today, the state flags of Alabama, Arkansas, 
Florida, and Georgia still contain elements of the Confederate flag.54 
While the “Lost Cause” had been a narrative of loss before the 1890s, 
it became a narrative of Southern victory over the rights of black 
Americans and Yankee rule. According to the study conducted by the 
SPLC, monuments and other symbols were spread across public property 
with the intention of projecting a message that the ideals fought for in the 
Civil War were still alive and strong in the South.55 Given that these ideals 
were rooted in viewing African Americans as chattel, the rise of the use of 
the Confederate flag during the Civil Rights movement was a response to 
the increasing claims of African Americans to equality.56 Despite well–
documented history of the Civil War, many Southerners continue to view 
the war as a “noble endeavor” fought to defend Southern honor and the 
region’s resistance in the face of Northern aggression.57 Thus, in their 
reappearance, Confederate symbolism coincided with resurgent white 
political power. As described in The Washington Post by Karen L. Cox, a 
history professor at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 
Confederate dedications were “part of a campaign to paint the Southern 
cause in the Civil War as just and slavery as a benevolent institution . . . . 
The monuments were put up as explicit symbols of white supremacy.”58 
“Not content to disenfranchise black men,” Cox adds, “Southern whites 
went on a lynching spree.”59According to the study conducted by the 
SPLC, “[t]his deeply rooted but false narrative is the result of many 
                                                                                                             
50 Darnell L. Weeden, How to Establish Flying the Confederate Flag with the State as 
Sponsor Violates the Equal Protection Clause, 34 AKRON L. REV. 521, 531 (2001). 
51 Forman, supra note 48, at 505. 
52 SPLC Report, supra note 12, at 6. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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decades of revisionism in the lore and even textbooks of the South that 
sought to create a more acceptable version of the region’s past.” In this 
way, erecting statues and memorials to the Confederacy allowed 
Southerners to not only honor those who fought in the war, but to also 
justify their cause, and vindicate a social order which subordinated blacks 
to whites.60 
V. THE CONFEDERACY & ITS LASTING IMPACT 
As part of the national debate surrounding Confederate iconography, 
supporters of the removal of these emblems argue that there is an 
important distinction between acknowledging the past and honoring the 
legacy of white supremacy. On the other hand, opponents of the removal 
or modification of these statues see them as parts of the Nation’s historical 
record, which allow for important teaching moments of how far we’ve 
come as a nation.61 While symbols and statues dedicated to the 
Confederacy were originally erected to exclude black Americans from full 
participation in public life and remind them remind of their subordinate 
position in the South, this note argues that they continue to serve as 
signposts that tell of the present–day perils of American racism. 
Symbolizing more than the Civil War and an era of slavery, 
Confederate monuments continue to stand for resistance to equality in the 
twentieth century. As illustrated by the tragic events in both Charleston 
and Charlottesville, racial tension and animus in the United States is not 
only a part of the nation’s past. In Stained Flags: Public Symbols and 
Equal Protection, Robert Bein discusses the symbolic power of a flag by 
noting that a symbol’s impact must be evaluated by what it means to the 
“public body represented” by it. Bein argues that when a symbol such as 
the Confederate flag does not treat all citizens underneath it equally, the 
excluded member is alienated from a national (or state) identity.62 Under 
this analysis, Bein notes that since the Confederate flag has been 
continually used throughout this century as a symbol by racist groups like 
the KKK or the White Aryan Resistance in their opposition to the equal 
treatment of blacks, “[i]t is clear that the Confederacy’s battle flag serves 
                                                                                                             
60 Karen L. Cox, The Whole Point of Confederate Monuments is to Celebrate White 
Supremacy, WASH. POST. (Aug. 16, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/16/the–whole–point–
of–confederate–monuments–is–to–celebrate–white–
supremacy/?utm_term=.d4fc61315e23. 
61 See infra notes 175–178 and accompanying text. 
62 Robert J. Bein, Stained Flags: Public Symbols and Equal Protection, 28 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 897, 900 (1998). 
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to divide residents of the South along racial lines.”63 Moreover, in How to 
Establish Flying the Confederate Flag with the State as Sponsor Violates 
the Equal Protection Clause, Darnell Weeden adds that “[b]ecause of its 
appeal to a prurient interest in race relations, the Confederate flag is ’the 
most inflammatory symbol that the South has.’”64 In light of the fact that 
the historical record fails to support the contention that the 
Confederacy was about states’ rights rather than slavery, Weeden argues 
that to conclude that the flying of the Confederate flag continues to foster 
a climate of racism is inevitable as Confederate symbols continue to 
communicate “sympathy with slavery, Jim Crow Laws, or that African–
American subservience is inescapable.”65 Photographed holding the 
Confederate battle flag and a handgun, Dylann Roof did so because the 
flag held particular symbolism to him and to others reading his website.66 
Similarly, the impassioned responses that resulted from the discovery of 
these photographs demonstrate the lasting significance of the Confederate 
flag in the minds of many as a symbol of hate.67 
Similar to the responses evoked by the display of the Confederate 
battle flag, violent responses to the removal of Confederate monuments 
demonstrate that while the force from these symbols stem from their 
history, their continued public display stands for a resistance to racial and 
political equality of African–Americans and other minorities in the United 
States. Despite the fact that arguments have been made regarding 
Confederate symbols as representative of a narrative that depicts the Civil 
War as a battle for states’ rights and Southern heritage,68 contemporary 
displays of exclusionary symbols continue to be used to intimidate and 
oppress racial minorities in the South. In North Carolina’s Heritage 
Protection Act Cementing Confederate Monuments in North Carolina’s 
Landscape, Kasi E. Wahlers argues that “[t]he fact that most of the 
monuments seen today were not erected in the years immediately 
following the Civil War changes their meaning for many people, who see 
them not as paying contemporaneous homage to war veterans, but instead 
as signaling to the public that white supremacy remains pervasive in the 
minds of many.”69 Similarly, in Landscape Fairness: 
Removing Discrimination from the Built Environment, Stephen Clowney 
                                                                                                             
63 Id. at 921.  
64 Weeden, supra note 50, at 551. 
65 Id. at 541. 
66 Maurie McInnis, Richmond Reoccupied by Men Who Wore the Gray, SLATE (July 1, 
2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2015/07/confederate_flag 
_it_s_not_a_symbol_of_southern_heritage_it_has_always_been.html. 
67 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
68 Weeden, supra note 50, at 540. 
69 Kasi E. Wahlers, North Carolina’s Heritage Protection Act Cementing Confederate 
Monuments in North Carolina’s Landscape, 94 N.C. L. REV. 2176 (2016). 
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points to scholarship in the social sciences to argue that the everyday 
landscape is a significant instrument of modern race–making as it 
“inscribes selective and misleading versions of the past in solid, material 
forms.”70 According to Clowney, although white Southerners originally 
erected Confederate monuments with the intention of rewriting the 
meaning of the Civil War and sending a message of racial superiority to 
colored minorities, landscapes, parks, and statues continue to marginalize 
African American communities by praising a white–dominated historical 
narrative that ignores or misrepresents the history of African Americans.71 
As illustrated by the manner in which a protest against the removal of 
a Confederate monument brought together a group of white supremacists 
in Charlottesville ranging from white nationalists to armed “Patriot” 
groups, Confederate monuments, like the Confederate battle flag, continue 
to be associated as a symbol of racial subordination for some.72 Although 
present day opposition against the removal of Confederate monuments has 
not always come in the form of violent demonstrations by racist hate 
groups, other forms of resistance following the events in Charleston and 
Charlottesville help provide insight into today’s political divide. As a 
consequence of the national reflection that began in Charleston, New 
Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu signed an ordinance calling for the 
removal of four Confederate monuments.73 Hours after a statue of 
Confederate General Robert E. Lee was removed from the New Orleans’ 
Lee Circle, Mayor Landrieu delivered a powerful speech at Gallier Hall 
which pointed out that Confederate monuments “purposefully celebrate a 
fictional, sanitized Confederacy, ignoring the death, ignoring the 
enslavement and the terror that it actually stood for.” In response to this 
event, Mississippi State Representative Karl Oliver voiced his 
opposition through social media by calling the action in New Orleans 
“heinous and horrific.”74 He went on to write: “If the, and I use this term 
extremely loosely, “leadership” of Louisiana wishes to, in a Nazi–ish 
fashion, burn books or destroy historical monuments of OUR HISTORY, 
                                                                                                             
70 Stephen Clowney, Landscape Fairness: Removing Discrimination from the Built 
Environment, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1, 3 (proposing that “all existing monuments and 
honorary spaces” should be subjected to a sunset provision in order to be reevaluated). 
71 Id. at 21. 
72 Flags and Other Symbols Used By Far–Right Groups in Charlottesville, SOUTHERN 
POVERTY LAW CENTER, (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/08/ 
12/flags–and–other–symbols–used–far–right–groups–charlottesville. 
73 See Logan Strother, Spencer Piston, & Thomas Ogorzalek, Are Confederate 
Monuments Our Heritage or Symbols of Hate?, NEWSWEEK (July 9, 2017), http://www. 
newsweek.com/are–confederate–monuments–our–heritage–or–symbols–hate–633678. 
74 See Kate Royals, Rep. Karl Oliver: Those Removing Confederate Monuments ‘Should 
Be Lynched’, MISSISSIPPI TODAY (May 21, 2017), https://mississippitoday.org/2017/05/21/ 
rep–karl–oliver–those–removing–confederate–monuments–should–be–lynched. 
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they should be LYNCHED! ”75 Although the lawmaker has since 
apologized, the message drew “likes” from two of Oliver’s fellow 
Republican lawmakers, Representative John Read and Representative 
Doug McLeod.76 
Moreover, as a response to New Orleans’ removal of some of its most 
prominent Confederate sculptures, lawmakers in other Southern states 
were prompted to enact laws that would make it harder for cities to take 
down Confederate monuments from public property.77 Commonly known 
as “Heritage Protection Acts,” or “HPAs,” these laws seek to protect 
Confederate statues and symbols from being removed or altered.78 The 
states that have anti–removal laws include: North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Kentucky, Tennessee and most recently, 
Alabama, which enacted its law in the Spring of 2017.79 Although the Acts 
                                                                                                             
75 Id. 
76 See Amy B. Wang, Lawmaker Apologizes after Saying Leaders ‘Should be 
LYNCHED’ for Removing Confederate Statues, WASH. POST. (May 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post–nation/wp/2017/05/22/lawmaker–says–louis 
iana–leaders–should–be–lynched–for–taking–down–confederate–statues/?utm_term=.207 
2ad9cf036.  
77 See Cultural History Artifact Management and Patriotism Act of 2015, ch. 170, 2015 
N.C. Sess. Laws 435, 435–36 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 100–2, 100–
2.1, 144–5, 144–9, 147–36, 160A–400.13 (2015)) (the Act was approved July 23, 2015). 
The official title of the Act is the “Cultural History Artifact Management and Patriotism 
Act of 2015.” Id. However, statutes of this kind are commonly called “Heritage Protection 
Acts.” See, e.g., Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of 2016, ch. 601, 2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts 
___ (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 4–1–412 (2015)); Alfred L. Brophy, North 
Carolina Heritage Protection Act, FACULTY LOUNGE (July 16, 2015), available at 
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/07/north–carolina–heritage–protection–act.html. 
78 See Jessica Bliss & Holly Meyer, In the South, Confederate Monuments Often 
Protected, Hard to Remove Thanks to State Laws, TENNESSEAN (last updated Aug. 17, 
2017), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2017/08/17/south–confederate–monument 
s–often–protected–hard–remove–state–laws/573226001/; see also John Moritz, Governor 
McCrory Signs Bill, Protecting North Carolina Confederate Monuments, ABC 11 (July 
24, 2015), http://abcll.com/politics/mccrory–signs–bill–protecting–confederate–monumen 
ts/876469 (describing Governor McCrory’s reaction to the bill). An example of this is seen 
in Mississippi’s proposed “Heritage Initiative” to amend its state constitution. See State 
Heritage, MISS. SEC’Y OF STATE CONST. INITIATIVES, https://www.sos.ms.gov/Ele 
ctions/Initiatives/InitiativeInfo.aspx?IId=46. Mississippi’s “Heritage Initiative” sought to 
reverse any renaming of structures originally named to honor the Confederacy, amend the 
Mississippi Constitution to designate a Confederate Heritage Month, and amend the state 
curriculum to include information about the state’s Confederate history. Id. The initiative 
also required that a state flag of equal size be displayed wherever the U.S. flag is on 
display. Id. 
79 See GA. CODE ANN. § 50–3–1(b) (2015) (preventing removal or alteration of 
military monuments); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15–15–81 (2015) (preventing removal of 
military monuments and renaming of public property named after military events or 
figures); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 10–1–165 (2015) (outlining different memorials that may 
not be removed or altered, by stating that state property named after historic figures may 
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vary considerably, each contains a provision for monument protection.80 
These laws generally restrict the removal, relocation, or alteration of any 
monument or “display of a permanent character” located on public 
property.81 Many of the laws require that either the legislature or a state 
commission approve any local effort to remove a monument. For instance, 
a Mississippi law states that statues, landmarks and memorials can’t be 
taken off public property unless they block drivers from seeing the road or 
are put in another approved location.82 While these legislative acts do not 
specifically target Confederate monuments or symbols, Heritage 
Protection Acts such as the one passed in North Carolina in July 2015 for 
example, were enacted following contentious public debate and rampant 
vandalism of Confederate monuments.83 Thus, it has been inferred by 
many that the purpose of such legislation is to mainly protect these 
monuments.84 
Unlike the aforementioned states, Florida has not passed similar anti–
removal laws. In spite of recently facing the “Soldiers’ and Heroes’ 
Monuments and Memorials Protection Act,” the bill was withdrawn from 
consideration by the Florida legislature.85 Introduced in January 20, 2017, 
the Act was intended to impose criminal penalties for “criminal mischief” 
which caused damage to certain remembrances erected to honor or 
commemorate a soldier or historical military figure. Although the Florida 
                                                                                                             
not be renamed, and preventing amendments to the statute without two–thirds vote of the 
North Carolina General Assembly); Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of 2016, ch. 601, 
2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 4–1–412 (2016)) (preventing 
removal of monuments in dedication of the military and renaming of public property but 
allowing counties and towns a mechanism to seek waiver of this prohibition); S.B. 13, 2016 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2016) (prohibiting any alteration to monuments or naming 
conventions honoring an enumerated list of historical events without first obtaining a 
waiver); H.B. 1229, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) (preventing removal of 
military monuments or renaming of public property). 
80 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 50–3–1(b) (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 55–15–81 (2015); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10–1–165(a) (2015); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 4–1–412 (2015). 
81 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 100–2.1(b) (2015) (The statute protect protects “objects of 
remembrance” from removal and defines such objects as “a monument, memorial, plaque, 
statue, marker, or display of a permanent character that commemorates an event, a person, 
or military service that is part of North Carolina’s history.”). 
82 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 55–15–81 (2013).  
83 See e.g., Wahlers, supra note 80, at 2176 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–127.1 (2015) 
(prohibiting, among other acts, vandalism to “statue[s] or monument[s] situated in any 
public place” in North Carolina)). 
84 Colin Campbell, NC House Could Ban Removal of Confederate and Other 
Monuments, NEWS & OBSERVER (July 15, 2015, 5:58 PM), http://www.newsobserver. 
com/news/politics–govemment/state–politics/article27345613.html (interpreting the 
statute as directly targeting Confederate monuments). 
85 The Florida Senate, SB 418: Soldiers’ and Heroes’ Monuments and Memorials 
Protection Act, (last visited Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2017/ 
00418. 
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legislature did not follow in the steps of its Southern neighbors, this type 
of monument protection legislation has generated controversy in some 
states. Claims brought against these HPAs involve criticism of the use of 
vague language in these statutes, which according to some, engenders 
confusion as to their proper scope.86 Other opponents have argued that 
localities, rather than state legislature, should be given the authority to 
erect, contextualize and remove statues as they deem appropriate for their 
communities.87 Finally, others have suggested that this form of legislation 
should be amended to include provisions that allow for the installation of 
plaques contextualizing these monuments as a more simple way to alter 
these laws.88 Despite the fact that some HPAs allow for Historical 
Commissions to grant waivers from these limitations,89 critics have 
argued that this exception, in addition to involving a long and convoluted 
process, still allows individuals to be sued by “any person who can 
demonstrate a real interest in a memorial through aesthetic, architectural, 
cultural, economic, environmental, or historic injury.”90 
Examined as a whole, it becomes clear that heated—and often 
violent—debates over whether to remove monuments to the Confederacy 
point to a lasting relevancy of the initial meaning of these monuments in 
the contemporary South. While to many white Southerners, Confederate 
symbols represent regional heritage and pride, they have a starkly different 
meaning to others who view them as emblems of slavery, racism, and the 
nation’s long history of oppression of African–Americans. Suggestions 
that the Confederate iconography in the United States exists solely as 
reminders of the violence that marginalized communities faced in the past 
suggests that what occurred then, is no longer happening now. The divide 
between those who think Confederate statues flags and other symbols 
should be preserved and those wish to rid our landscape of them, 
demonstrates that it is not simply about stone or metal, or a difference of 
opinion regarding the Confederacy, but about what these things represent 
                                                                                                             
86 See, e.g., Wahlers, supra note 80, at 2196 (calling for revisions on the part of the North 
Carolina General Assembly to address the statute’s broad reach, as the “application of 
the ’displays of a permanent character’ provision can produce idiosyncratic results.”). 
87 See Seth McLaughlin, Virginia State Law Protecting Confederate Monuments May 
Be Revised, WASH. POST. (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 
2017/aug/24/confederate–monuments–law–in–virginia–may–be–revis; see also Madison 
Park, Removal of Confederate Monuments Stirs Backlash in Statehouses, CNN (last 
updated May 12, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/12/us/confederate–monument–state 
–bills/index.html. 
88 Wahlers, supra note 80, at 2196. 
89 TENN. CODE. ANN. § 4–1–412 (2016). 
90 See Cari W. Gervin, The Tennessee Heritage Protection Act Shields Confederate 
Monuments, NASHVILLE SCENE (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.nashvillescene.com/news/ 
cover–story/article/20976874/the–tennessee–heritage–protection–act–shields–confederate 
–monuments. 
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to many people regarding our country’s efforts – or lack thereof – to 
confront its legacy of genocide and slavery. 
VI. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES AS 
MEANS TO ADDRESS RACIALIZED SYMBOLS 
A. Rethinking Judicial Action 
In considering what should be done about the nation’s lingering 
memorials to the Confederate States of America, supporters of their 
removal may have a difficult time relying on strategy that depends on 
judicial action. While activists may be tempted to call upon the law to 
effectuate change in landscapes that perpetuate racist ideology or alienate 
minority populations, the Supreme Court has erected roadblocks to the 
prosecution of civil rights cases in recent years.91 On close inspection, this 
approach is unlikely to be successful for the reasons discussed below. 
1. The Weakness of a Fourteenth Amendment Approach 
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that no state 
shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws,”92 has consistently been interpreted to bar discrimination based on 
race.93 As shown by a series of landmark cases, the Equal Protection 
Clause has been used to as a way to undo the structures of white supremacy 
and racial subordination. The decisions in Brown v. Board of Education,94 
Loving v. Virginia,95 and NAACP v. Button,96 all applied the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                             
91 Clowney, supra note 70, at 58–61. 
92 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
93 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291–92 
(1978); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“The central purpose of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct 
discriminating on the basis of race.”); see also Rice v. Sioux City Mem’l Park Cemetery, 
349 U.S. 70, 80 (1955) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should not dismiss a 
claim of racial bias under the Fourteenth Amendment even though the petitioner was the 
only individual affected). 
94 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 873 (1954). 
95 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
96 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (finding that a Virginia statute restricting a 
lawyer’s ability to solicit clients violated the NAACP’s First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights). 
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Amendment to bring about change in unjust power relationships between 
white and black Americans. However, despite its history in federal courts, 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been 
interpreted more narrowly in its potential to amend social wrongs.97 
Although a primary goal of the Equal Protection Clause is to prevent 
intentional governmental conduct that discriminates on the basis of race,98 
current case law demands that a litigant challenging a facially 
neutral government action under the Equal Protection Clause must satisfy 
a two–pronged test to bring a claim. Once it has been established that the 
government’s undertaking results in disproportionate effects among 
different racial groups, the litigant must then prove that racial 
discrimination was the intent or motivating factor behind the act.99 
Discriminatory impact alone is not sufficient to serve as a basis for a 
violation of equal protection of the laws.100 However, as shown by recent 
jurisprudence, proving the existence of discriminatory intent is no easy 
task. 
The resistance by judges to removing racialized symbols from state–
owned property is most clearly seen in the struggle over the removal of 
Confederate flag in recent years.101 In 1990, the Eleventh Circuit rejected 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s 
(“NAACP”) claim that the Constitution of the United States and federal 
statutes mandate the removal of the flag from the Alabama state capitol in 
NAACP v. Hunt.102 Central to its reasoning was the conclusion that there 
was no unequal application of state policy as all citizens were exposed to 
the flag, and citizens of all races could be offended by its position.103 
Rather than finding that the plaintiffs’ grievance stemmed from having to 
view a flag as a symbol of a history of vocal resistance to racial and 
political equality for African–Americans, the court found that it was “not 
certain that the flag was hoisted for racially discriminatory reasons.”104 
Instead, the court concluded that the source of the plaintiffs’ grievance 
stemmed not the Confederate flag or the law itself, but an inability to 
                                                                                                             
97 See infra notes 116 and accompanying text. 
98 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1985) (quoting Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977)). 
99 Id. at 225–26. 
100 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–42 (1976) (deciding that in order to hold 
the government liable for racial discrimination under either the Fifth or Fourteenth 
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101 See Forman, supra note 48, at 507. 
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control their “own emotions.”105 In other words, plaintiffs had to turn 
elsewhere for relief as they couldn’t prove that racial animus motivated 
the decision to display the Confederate flag on the Alabama state capitol. 
Like in Hunt, the Eleventh Circuit found that the incorporation of the 
Confederate flag within the Georgia state flag did not violate citizens’ 
equal protection rights in Coleman v. Miller.106 In Coleman, the plaintiff 
argued that the state’s adoption and display of the flag was racially 
discriminatory and violated his right to equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.107 While the district court in fact found that the 
adoption of the Georgia flag was partly motivated by racism,108 the court 
of appeals did not reach the question of discriminatory intent as it rejected 
the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment challenge because it could find no 
present disparate effect.109 In its analysis of the disparate impact, 
the Coleman court required that the plaintiff “present specific factual 
evidence to demonstrate that the Georgia flag presently imposes on 
African–Americans as a group a measurable burden or denies them an 
identifiable benefit.”110 The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument of 
disparate impact based on his perception of the flag as a symbol of racial 
segregation and its subsequent psychological effect on him.111 In the 
absence of specific evidence of measurable or identifiable disparate 
impact, the court concluded that there had been no Fourteenth Amendment 
violation.112 
As seen in a more recent example, the U.S Supreme Court refused to 
hear the appeal of Carlos E. Moore, an African–American lawyer from 
Grenada, Mississippi on November 27, 2017.113 In Moore v. Bryant,114 
Moore challenged the design of the Mississippi flag under the 14th 
Amendment’s equal–protection clause, as it remains the last state flag in 
                                                                                                             
105 Id. at 1565. 
106 Coleman v. Miller, 912 F. Supp. 522, 525–28 (N.D. Ga. 1996), aff’d, 117 F.3d 527 
(11th Cir. 1997). 
107 See Coleman, 117 F.3d at 528. 
108 See Coleman v. Miller, 885 F. Supp. 1561, 1569, 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (denying 
motion for preliminary injunction). 
109 See Coleman, 117 F.3d at 530–31(rejecting plaintiff’s challenge to the Georgia flag 
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113 Olivia Beavers, Supreme Court Rejects Case Challenging Use of Confederate 
Emblem in Mississippi Flag, THE HILL (Nov. 27, 2017), http://thehill.com/regulation/cou 
rt–battles/362066–supreme–court–rejects–case–challenging–use–of–confederate–
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114 Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834 (S.D. Miss. 2016), aff’d, 853 F.3d 245 (5th 
Cir. 2017). 
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the U.S. to incorporate the Confederate emblem.115 Although countless 
arguments have been made regarding the Confederate battle flag as a 
symbol that deeply offensive to black Americans,116 both the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi and the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals ruled that Moore lacked legal standing to challenge the state 
flag.117 In its decision, the district court found that Moore’s “argument that 
he feels like a second–class citizen does not give rise to a legal injury.”118 
Moreover, the court found Moore had no constitutional right to be free 
from anxiety from state displays of historical racism.119 Although on 
appeal the 5th Circuit didn’t deny that the flag might have a deep and 
personal effect on Moore, the court found that the plaintiff’s alleged 
stigmatic injury was not the type over which he could sue the state.120 
2. The Weakness of a Thirteenth Amendment Approach 
In his lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Mississippi state 
flag, Moore alleged that the incorporation of the Confederate battle 
emblem in the state flag violated not only the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
the Thirteenth Amendment as well.121 To support his allegation that the 
Confederate battle emblem is a vestige of slavery that incites racial 
violence, Moore pointed to the mass killing of nine African–Americans 
church members in Charleston, South Carolina.122 Additionally, Moore 
cited a November 2015 incident at a Wal–Mart in Tupelo, Mississippi 
where a man set off an explosive to protest Wal–Mart’s decision to cease 
the sale of Confederate–themed merchandise; and a 2014 hate crime at the 
University of Mississippi where university students draped a noose and 
                                                                                                             
115 See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Asked to Consider Mississippi’s Use of 
Confederate Image, WASH. POST. (Sept. 10, 2017), 
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the former Georgia state flag—which contained the Confederate battle 
emblem – around the neck of a statue of the University’s first African–
American student.123 
While courts have maintained the judiciary’s role under the Thirteenth 
Amendment as limited only to enforcing the Amendment’s prohibition of 
literal enslavement,124 it is important to note that scholars have argued that 
display of Confederate symbols on official state property should be 
prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment.125 In addition to prohibiting 
slavery or involuntary servitude, the Supreme Court has held that the 
Thirteenth Amendment also empowers Congress to end any lingering 
badges and incidents of slavery.126 The Court, however, has failed to 
specify as to how lower courts should define the badges and incidents of 
slavery in the absence of congressional action.127 In his article, The 
Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment Approach, 
Alexander Tsesis contends that state use of Confederate symbols violates 
Thirteenth Amendment because they serve to exclude black individuals 
from the dominant narrative.128 As one the remaining vestiges of the ante–
bellum South, the Confederate battle flag, represents a badge of 
servitude.129 According to Tsesis, “[w]hen Confederate symbols are placed 
on tax–supported property they reinvigorate the psychological incidents of 
servitude, comforting supremacists with the message that while overt 
racism is no longer tolerated, the nod and wink variety still is 
countenanced.”130 Although in principle, the federal government should 
be able to prohibit the states from displaying Confederate symbols because 
they “place persons, in particular blacks, on notice that they are outsiders 
living freely only at the dominant group’s behests,”131 courts have been 
reluctant to find a private right of action as previously mentioned. In Race, 
Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents 
of Slavery, William M. Carter suggests that due to the fact that “there is 
currently no consistent approach to determining the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s self–executing scope that would comport both with the 
Amendment’s original purposes as well as a vision of the Amendment as 
having continuing vitality,” courts have refused to take on a more 
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Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1312 (2007). 
125 See generally Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth 
Amendment Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539 (2002). 
126 Carter, supra note 124, at 1312. 
127 Id. 
128 Tsesis, supra note 125, at 543. 
129 Id. at 556. 
130 Id. at 555. 
131 Id. at 611. 
2018] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW 129 
 
expansionist approach which would help combat various forms of 
inequality.132 
3. The Weakness of a First Amendment Approach 
In addition to challenging the constitutionality of the public displays 
of Confederate symbols under the Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendment, 
litigants have also argued that the First Amendment’s guarantee of free 
speech has the power to invalidate racialized monuments in the landscape 
because it is a form of racist government speech that affects the speech 
rights of black Americans.133 Ultimately, the argument relies on the 
principle that when a government constructs or maintains Confederate 
monuments, memorial parks, and other dedications on public land for 
example, it is invariably making decisions about the message it wants to 
emit. By limiting the monuments it hosts to those that emit a particular 
point of view, the government is preventing all community members from 
having their voices heard in these public spaces.134 For instance, in 
choosing to host a Confederate monument in the “Plaza de la 
Constitution,” – while excluding a monument to the Union War dead– the 
city of St. Augustine in Florida is validating one group’s speech and 
ignoring the expression of their opponents.135 Thus, by dedicating or 
maintaining expressive monuments and symbols that support the voices of 
a white majority at the expense of other views, Governments are 
discriminating against alternative viewpoints. In principle, the First 
Amendment would generally bar this. Certainly, one major issue with this 
argument is that it is not always clear when the government is speaking 
for itself rather than unconstitutionally restricting others’ 
speech. Nevertheless, this argument is doomed to fail as the Supreme 
Court has held that the Free Speech Clause does not regulate government 
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L. REV. 581 (2006) (describing how physical spaces can discipline speech); see also 
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Change and the ”Creative Destruction” 
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speech.136 Supreme Court jurisprudence on the government speech 
doctrine makes clear that the government does not infringe upon the free 
speech rights of an individual when it refuses to use a viewpoint of 
neutrality in its own speech.137 In fact, state governments can make their 
own content–based decision as they are exempt from First Amendment 
scrutiny.138 
In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Supreme Court refused to 
apply the Free Speech Clause to a City’s acceptance of a privately donated, 
permanent monument for installation in a public park located in Pleasant 
Grove, Utah.139 The Summum, a religious organization, then brought suit 
under the First Amendment, insisting that the city had engaged in 
viewpoint discrimination by excluding the group from a public space in its 
refusal to accept the monument containing the Seven Aphorisms of 
Summum.140 Although the park already hosted 11 permanent, privately 
donated displays, including a Ten Commandments monument,141 Pleasant 
Grove refused the monument, arguing that it limited Park monuments to 
those either directly related to the City’s history or donated by groups with 
longstanding community ties.142 
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court ruled against the 
Summum and found that the placement of a permanent monument in a 
public park was a form of government speech and was therefore not 
subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.143 According to the 
majority, “[a] monument, by definition, is a structure that is designed as a 
means of expression. When a government entity arranges for the 
construction of a monument, it does so because it wishes to convey some 
thought or instill some feeling in those who see the structure.”144 The Court 
reasoned that the state must have the ability to privilege certain facts and 
opinion for government to function properly.145 In his opinion, Justice 
Alito concluded, “[i]f every citizen were to have a right to insist that no 
one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed,” Alito 
                                                                                                             
136 David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1637 
(2006) (Fagundes argues that government speech deserves constitutional protection only 
in occasions where the speech furthers democratic self–government). 
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138 Id. 
139 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009). 
140 Id. at 466. 
141 Id. (In addition to the Ten Commandments, the park included a display of a historic 
granary, a wishing well, and a September 11 monument). 
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143 Id. at 465. 
144 Id. at 470. A close reading of the Summum decision reveals that its scope remains 
open for debate. It may not always be true that all monuments amount to government 
speech. 
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writes, “debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited 
to those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know 
it radically transformed.”146 
Similarly, in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
the Supreme Court held that the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles did 
not violate the First Amendment in refusing to issue a license plate with 
the Confederate battle flag.147 The case involved the Texas Division of 
the Sons of Confederate Veterans that sought to have a specialty license 
plate issued in the state of Texas with an image of the Confederate Battle 
Flag. After the denial of their request, the group sued, claiming that 
denying a specialty plate was a violation of their First Amendment 
rights.148 In a 5–4 decision, the Court found that license plates are 
government speech and thus, as the speaker, the Texas Department of 
Motor Vehicles Board could not violate the speech clause of the First 
Amendment.149 
In the alternative, litigants have also argued in support of the 
regulation or restriction of Confederate symbols – in particular, the 
Confederate flag – by pointing out that racist hate speech falls outside the 
protection of the First Amendment. Government restrictions on hate 
speech, however, often fail to survive First Amendment scrutiny. While 
racist hate speech undermines the constitutional principle of equality, as a 
general matter, such expressions are protected speech. Because of the 
difficulties in applying a definition of racist speech that is not 
unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad, the Supreme Court has found 
that the government simply may not outlaw symbols of hate or bigotry, 
such as the swastika or the Confederate battle flag under the First 
Amendment. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle in 
Matal v. Tam.150 Decided in 2017, the Court found that there is no 
exception to First Amendment protections for hate speech. In Matal, the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) refused to register “The Slants” as a 
band’s trademark under a Lanham Act, on the ground that the name might 
be offensive to Asian Americans. While the government’s intention was 
                                                                                                             
146 Id. at 468 (citing Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1990)). 
147 Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2239, 2245 
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determining the content of what it says.”). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 198 L. Ed. 2d 366 (2017) (In Matal, the Supreme 
Court held that trademarks are private, not government, speech. Id. at 1757–61. The Court 
concluded that § 2(a)’s bar on the registration of disparaging marks discriminated based on 
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be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.” Id. at 1751 (Alito, J.)). 
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to only deny the band certain protections that trademarks get against 
unauthorized use by third parties, the Court found that viewpoint 
discrimination – including against allegedly offensive viewpoints – is 
unconstitutional. In his opinion, Justice Samuel Alito wrote: 
[The idea that the government may restrict] speech 
expressing ideas that offend  . . .  strikes at the heart of the 
First Amendment. Speech that demeans on the basis of 
race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any 
other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of 
our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the 
freedom to express “the thought that we hate. 
In light of the case law mentioned above, individuals who intend to 
bring about change in Florida landscape by seeking the removal of 
Confederate symbols should consider prior case law before pursuing 
strategies that solely rely on judicial action. Although the Supreme Court 
has made clear that racially motivated laws that have a disparate impact 
on blacks violate the Equal Protection Clause – even if they are considered 
to be facially neutral151 – courts have limited the instances in which 
individuals can prevail in cases based on racial bias. Under current 
jurisprudence, it is extremely difficult to prove both present disparate 
effect and discriminatory intent, as required to bring an Equal Protection 
case. Even in occasions where courts may find a Confederate symbol’s 
display results from racist intent, litigants will have a hard time proving 
present disparate effect that goes beyond injuries that are not clearly 
traceable to the Confederate symbol in question. Moreover, under the 
government speech doctrine in First Amendment, individuals cannot force 
states to erect certain monuments in support of the Union, or symbols to 
honor civil rights leaders in the same way that the Summum could not 
force Pleasant Grove to accept its monument, or the Texas Division of 
the Sons of Confederate Veterans could not force the Board to adopt its 
specialty License Plates. Following the Court’s decision in Matal, 
governments cannot prohibit a public display of Confederate symbols 
under the First Amendment unless the public display is deemed to have 
been conveyed in a manner that constitutes a true threat.152 
                                                                                                             
151 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227 (1985); Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977); see also Personnel Admin. 
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B. Issues With the “Museum Solution” 
In his book, Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing 
Societies, Sanford Levinson argues that over time, the destruction of civic 
monuments has become a central symbol of revolutionary 
transformation.153 Levinson expresses that there is something totalitarian 
about the notion that public space must be completely “cleansed” of 
reminders of past evil.154 For this reason, he discusses a series of possible 
responses to Confederate symbols in the Texas public landscape, which 
according to him, implicitly emits a message of racist culture.155 These 
range from destroying the monuments of Confederate soldiers, to adding 
a brand new monument honoring either slaves or the Union soldiers who 
emerged victorious.156 According to Levinson, the more “moderate” or 
“intermediate” solution includes moving the offensive statue from the 
“sacred space” such as the Capitol grounds, to a Historical Museum.157 In 
this section, I aim to examine the strengths and weaknesses of this 
proffered solution. 
One way of defending the maintenance of such monuments on public 
grounds is for individuals and/or communities to view them through lenses 
of aesthetics or history.158 Through this method, political or cultural traces 
attached to the monuments at the time of their creation can be overlooked 
as communities decide which monuments should stay or be relocated.159 
As expressed by some Americans, statues can also be removed from public 
land, but preserved for posterity either by a private collector, or by a 
museum.160 Certainly, this option differs from simply relocating 
Confederate monuments from one city’s public grounds to another and 
displayed without an explanation of the circumstances of the Civil 
War.161 In any event, one purpose of museums is to place such artifacts in 
their proper historical context, “by transforming them from tutelary 
objects to historicized emblems of a past that may well be viewed as no 
                                                                                                             
153 See generally Sanford Levinson, Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing 
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160 Holland Cotter, We Need to Move, Not Destroy Confederate Monuments, N.Y. 
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longer possessing a genuine normative claim on us today.”162 Monuments 
could be adorned with plaques that explain what the Confederacy stood 
for and contextualize the manner in which most of these memorials were 
erected as part of a campaign of often state–sanctioned white supremacist 
terror and oppression. This position would also allow State governments 
(and thus taxpayers) from having to pay to maintain monuments dedicated 
to the Confederacy, without having to destroy them.163 Furthermore, 
continued display of artifacts that are seen by some, as valuable parts of 
our complex cultural heritage would continue, even if they no longer serve 
as symbols of the initial purpose of which many of them were intended 
for.164 
However, as described by Levinson in his article, Thomas Ruffin and 
the Politics of Public Honor: Political Change and the “Creative 
Destruction” of Public Space, “such aestheticizing or historicizing moves 
may be much easier to make (and to be found tolerable) the more distant 
the past and, perhaps, the more the sheer ignorance about the specific 
events or persons that might be commemorated.”165 In light of the fact that 
Confederate symbols gained prominence around the turn of the 20th 
century, and then once more during the civil rights movement, they cannot 
be considered to be part of a distant past.166 Moreover, as their continued 
display emits selective versions of a past that valorizes white heroes, and 
fails to acknowledge black suffering, others may not view this strategy as 
a truly “neutral” solution.167 Individuals who feel only the destruction of 
these symbols can resolve the issue will feel that their placing in a state 
museum will not rid them of all public esteem. Instead, they will continue 
to exalt their Confederate subjects, who fought to preserve slavery and 
racial subordination. Moreover, it is possible that any museum with Civil 
War memorabilia inside can become a shrine for those that continue to 
admire the values of the Confederacy. At the same time, those who believe 
in the causes of the Confederacy will object to the explicit political and 
cultural meanings of such displacement.168 And, of course, it is also 
possible to argue that although the statues were not originally meant to 
educate future generations about the evils of racial segregation, it is 
nonetheless a lesson of American history which will be diminished if 
removed from prominent public and put display in a museum. 
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168 Id. at 695. 
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Whatever the merits of this solution may be in some instances, it not 
sufficient to resolve the all tensions generated by contemporary displays 
of Confederate iconography. While this option may settle conflict over 
what to do with one Confederate statue of a particular general, it does not 
tell us what to do with the numerous other statues dedicated to 
commemorate the same Confederate figure.169 In most cases, there may be 
no such need for multiple artifacts of the same thing.170 Thus, facing the 
question of when the destruction of some public artifacts is permissible, 
will still be inevitable.171 Moreover, according to Levinson, “[s]ome 
artifacts, after all, depend for their power on occupying certain spaces.”172 
The solution mentioned above also fails to resolve what to do with larger 
scale monuments,173 such as the 50–foot pillar topped with a statue of 
General Lee in the center of Pensacola.174 In those instances, for example, 
there may be no feasible alternative between leaving it where it is, or 
destroying it. 
C.  Issues with the Complete Destruction of Monuments 
In addition to the complications of a court–centered strategy or the 
“museum solution,” activists should consider the problems that may result 
with the complete destruction of Confederate monuments. Although some 
observers and participants hope to dispose visible traces of the 
Confederacy, other Americans still believe that keeping them where they 
stand helps preserve evidence of this vitally important chapter in our 
past.175 Despite growing consensus about the problematic aspect of these 
emblems, groups who stand against Confederate symbols have even been 
compared to ‘‘the Taliban in Afghanistan’’ in their desire to remove 
monuments.176 Former Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, articulated 
this point during an interview with Cameron Smith of AL.com in May 
2017: 
One of the things about statues and monuments and the 
like is that for those who weren’t a part of that history, it 
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can be a reminder . . . Nobody is alive today who 
remembers the Civil War, but by looking at that, you can 
trigger what it meant and what it was like. You don’t have 
to honor the purposes of people whose history now shows 
that they were on the other side of history, but you better 
be able to remind people. 
So, I myself and not much for whitewashing history. I 
don’t like the renaming, I don’t like the taking down [of] 
various monuments. I know that, for instance, the flag — 
the Confederate flag — I agree completely with Nikki 
Haley and others. That was a battle flag of the defeated 
Confederacy. That’s a different matter. But these 
historical figures, we need to remember who they are, 
what they stood for, and why we’ve moved on.177 
While possible to argue that history that the history the statues’ 
defenders want to preserve is in fact a distorted memory, it is also 
important that individuals take into account that a strategy such as this one 
may trigger damaging political backlash against other strategies employed 
to make the landscape more balanced. As shown by the tumult in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, a large population of the nation’s citizenry still 
desires to keep current dedications and memorials that transmit the values 
of the Confederacy.178 Besides the large costs that come with the removal 
of monuments,179 it is unlikely that most Southern states will comply. 
Public surveys reveal that not only do a majority of Southerners believe it 
is appropriate for cities to exalt Confederate leaders, but in certain places, 
some still wish the South had emerged victorious from the war.180 Given 
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these facts, it may be counterproductive to seek the rapid destruction of all 
confederate monuments and symbols as this may result in more violence 
and further complicate the implementation of other reforms to the built 
environment. 
Furthermore, it is also important to consider that neither destroying, 
or moving Confederate monuments and symbols will entirely resolve the 
problem of only having some community members feel like their voices 
and beliefs are represented in the symbols that are being displayed in their 
communities. Rather than advocating for a sweeping ban on any 
Confederate monuments decorating a landscape, community groups must 
consider the different types of statues that dominate public squares or 
university campuses, the naming of government, and other buildings 
reinforce the point that any consideration of what to do with Confederate 
memorials must go beyond these statues.181 In the case of names of 
buildings dedicated to the Confederacy, there appear to be no intermediate 
solutions.182 Similar to large–scale monuments, these names must either 
remain or be changed. As pointed out by the SPLC report, at least 109 
public schools are named after prominent Confederate figures,183 7 alone 
of which are located in the state of Florida,184 despite the fact that they 
have predominately black student populations.185 
VII. ESTABLISHING COUNTER–NARRATIVES – AN ALTERNATIVE 
APPROACH 
In looking to the future, the need for racial reconciliation and social 
transformation requires a set of conversations regarding slavery, its 
legacy, and thoughtful responses thereto. While scholars of law have 
rarely examined the problems that the built environment imposes on black 
communities, in his article, Clowney points out that “[g]eographers, in 
contrast, have long offered suggestions to mitigate the harms caused by 
landscape unfairness. Although details vary, the thrust of the geography 
literature is that minority groups should alter the landscape by building 
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their own counter discourses. According to this scholarly tradition, 
African Americans should craft their own monuments, mark their own 
histories, and contribute to the visible form of the American scene.”186 
With this in mind, the pages that follow describe one strategy that can be 
utilized in response to the continued display of Confederate monuments 
and other symbols which continue to ignore the history and perspectives 
of African Americans. Keeping in line with Clowney’s suggestion that 
“any successful attempt to improve the balance of the landscape should 
both empower subaltern communities and navigate the political economy 
of dominant group decision making at the local level,”187 this note argues 
for the creation of remembrance memorials as a way to help influence the 
force of collective memory in which a community’s remembrance of racial 
injustices in the past can help influence the way individuals deal with those 
that are still seen today. 
To better help Southern communities remember the past and 
understand current realities of institutionalized racism and its implications 
in the United States, state legislatures or county commissions should strive 
to create task forces to propose and fund the development of 
commemorative events, monuments, memorials, or 
remembrance museums to accurately portray a national legacy of racial 
discrimination. In the spirit of Langston Hughes’s poem “I, Too,” 188 these 
permanent and public sites can help communities emit a message of the 
African–American story as being central to the country’s narrative. Given 
that remembrance museums or memorials serve to dedicate spaces to the 
collection, preservation, research, and exhibition 
of African American historical and cultural materials, a conversation can 
be started about the values and beliefs held by a community that may have 
previously muted by the ideals of a white majority. Through these projects, 
community groups can have the opportunity to investigate the history of 
slavery in their own backyard to further understand its significance and be 
able to commemorate the contributions of black Americans who 
originated from those areas. Keeping in mind the underlying political 
variables which shape the decisions of governments to keep or maintain 
these monuments, symbols, or names in dedication of the Confederacy, 
these remembrance initiatives can serve as an alternative option that may 
lead to better informed, more rational, and racially sensitive decision 
making in dozens of communities. In an effort to assist the efforts of local 
communities, the following sections point to examples of more recent 
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endeavors, which set out to position counter–narratives in the American 
landscape. 
A. EJI’s Community Remembrance Project 
The Equal Justice Initiative’s (“EJI”) Community Remembrance 
Project is part of a campaign to recognize the victims of lynching by 
collecting soil from lynching sites and building a lasting memory of the 
racial injustice that occurred in the South.189 In the Spring of 2018, the 
nonprofit will open its Memorial to Peace and Justice dedicated to victims 
of lynching in Montgomery, Alabama.190 While there are currently no 
prominent monuments or memorials in the United States that 
commemorate the victims of these attacks, in Montgomery alone, there are 
59 monuments and memorials to the Confederacy.191 Through various 
forms of data collection, EJI has identified “more than 4,000 lynchings, 
which took place between 1877 and 1950 and involved black men, women, 
and children, who were hanged, burned alive, shot, drowned, and beaten 
to death by white mobs.”192 The project, made possible by MASS Design 
Group,193 recognizes community grief and victims of mass violence 
through the gathering of community members with the purpose of 
collecting soil across lynching sites in Alabama.194 The soil is then labeled 
with the date of the lynching and the victim’s names (if recorded), and 
used as part of an exhibit that will reflect the history of lynching. In 
addition, the memorial also hosts 800 suspended columns representing the 
800 counties across 12 states where lynchings took place, each column 
inscribed with the names of the murdered.195 Rather than ignoring its 
history, this project serves as an example of one of many solutions through 
which a community can confront ongoing challenges of racial inequality. 
B. The West Medford Afro–American Remembrance Project 
Furthermore, the West Medford Afro–American Remembrance 
Project serves as another example of a multi–year project intended to 
document the legacy of blacks from one of the oldest Afro–American 
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communities in the United States.196 A committee comprising of several 
longstanding residents partnered with the Medford Historical Society, the 
Department of Sociology and Anthropology from Tufts and Brandeis 
University, and students from Medford High School, to document the lives 
and achievements of those who were pioneers of the community through 
teaching materials and the development of a website.197 The project, 
funded by Medford Historical Society, Tufts and Brandeis Universities, 
and the U.S. Department of Education, is included as a part of Project 
LOCAL (Learning Our Community’s American Lore).198 
As part of this initiative, oral histories were conducted under the 
supervision of Tufts Department of Sociology and Anthropology, 
Associate Professor, Rosalind Shaw in 2005 and 2006.199 The collection 
involves oral histories of notable figures, both living and dead, who played 
a significant role in the life of the neighborhood.200 Students in Shaw’s 
class, “Place, Race and Memory: The West Medford Afro–American 
Remembrance Project,” were each assigned a person or a couple to 
research and interview along with “resource people” who are in some way 
uniquely connected to the person.201 In the case of deceased subjects, 
students were instructed to compile the biographies through interviews 
with at least three people who knew the subjects well.202 The completed 
oral histories were then digitized and added to Tufts Digital Library203, and 
biographies along with other materials are used to create an exhibit at the 
Medford Historical Society Museum.204 Some of these materials include, 
audiocassette interviews, transcripts, student papers, and release forms.205 
Intended to help preserve West Medford’s African–American history, the 
topics covered include growing up in West Medford, school 
desegregation, employment opportunities, as well as a general sense of 
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what it was like to grow up in this area as an African–American during the 
mid–twentieth century.206 
C. The National Museum of African American History and 
Culture 
At the national level, the recent opening of the National Museum of 
African American History and Culture (“NMAAHC”) located in on the 
National Mall in Washington, D.C., has helped document a long and rich 
history of African Americans in the United States.207 Maintained by the 
Smithsonian, the museum is dedicated to the collection, preservation, 
research, and exhibition of African American historical and cultural 
material reflecting the breadth and depth of the experiences of persons of 
African descent living in the United States. Before its opening in 2016, the 
museum conducted an “Antiques Roadshow” project in 15 cities which 
encouraged people to provide their own family heirlooms, and yielded 
around 40,000 of the objects now displayed by the museum.208 While it 
holds a wide range of exhibits detailing the nation’s racial history, the 
museum’s displays also document an evolving story of persistent 
inequality through the exhibition of more modern artifacts like; a “Justice 
4 Trayvon” placard, a photo of a house following Hurricane Katrina, and 
newspaper cutouts after the election of President Obama.209 Due to its 
powerful displays, docents were trained to help visitors cope with their 
emotions. With the intention of creating a space for reflection, the museum 
also set aside a space called the “contemplative court,” where people can 
take a moment to come to terms with what they have seen.210 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
While there are many today who see Confederate emblems as symbols 
of history, region, or even as statements in favor of states’ rights, these 
monuments have generally been first and foremost, symbols of white 
supremacy intended to exclude African–Americans from full participation 
in public life. Used to communicate a history of racial oppression and to 
intimidate in the present, Confederate monuments have seen various 
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efforts to be modified or removed all together. Given the current 
difficulties of relying on judicial intervention or legislative interpretations, 
communities may better challenge the dominant historical narratives by 
shifting their efforts toward investing in remembrance projects or 
dedications as a more direct form of engagement. 
